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Introduction
Linux and open-source software is an important emerging movement in the software industry. IDC predicts double-digit growth of Linux adoption. 1 The U.S. Another contribution of the research is that we attempt to model real information technology (IT) management and IT adoption issues, looking into specific aspects of the IT infrastructure, an approach neglected by economics research and often by information systems economics research, as well. We capture important IT aspects, such as the heterogeneity of firms applications and capabilities, and concerns of IT managers, such as the optimization of their IT architecture and IT investment, into economic modeling.
President s Information
The paper helps IT managers optimize their IT investment decisions taking into account
the emergence of open source software and characterizes the IT architecture equilibrium of firms.
In our model firms are heterogeneous in terms of their IT capabilities. Also every firm uses a range of applications, from server-based enterprise applications, to clientbased personal productivity applications. This range of applications defines the IT architecture of the firm. The choice of a firm is whether to use an open source or a proprietary software infrastructure for each application, so that it maximizes the value of its whole IT architecture. There are also network effects that depend on the installed base of each application and a misfit cost which captures the fact that a given software product is ideal for some applications but less fit for other applications.
We find that there are a number of adoption patterns that depend on the strength of the network effect and the misfit cost for the applications. Most often firms have a heterogeneous software infrastructure using both proprietary and open source software. Raymond (2001) and Fink (2003) provide good overviews.
A Simple Model
Open source products differ from proprietary products in many perspectives.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the most influential factor that drives the customers adoption decision is low cost and "openness" of open source software. Openness provides customers with the ability to access the source code, easily modify the base product and derive further applications (Fink, 2003; Rosenberg, 2000) . However, the value of openness, which we call derivative value, is not necessarily the same to all firms. For example, firms with higher IT competence are capable of deriving higher value from the open source product (Dedrick and West, 2004 ).
In the current model, we focus on three key factors which can differ between proprietary and open source software. These are price, basic functionalities, and potential derivative values, which also differ across customers depending on their IT competence.
In particular, there are two products in the market: one open source product (O) and one proprietary product (P). The marginal production costs for both are zero.
Customers can download the open source product for free and have access to the source code, or purchase the proprietary product at a price p without access to the source code.
3 Customers are heterogeneous in their IT competence, which is captured by (
There is a continuum mass 1 of customers. Customers benefit both from the functions of the software by itself and from positive consumption externalities within the same product network, assuming incompatibility. We assume an additive utility function, following many other studies (Economides and Himmelberg, 1995; Farrell and Saloner, 1986) . A customer that adopts the product
, gets utility:
3 Since the basic model focuses on the adoption side, we will treat this price as exogenous. Making this price endogenous, can be part of the model extensions.
where h n i is the benefit from product i s network externality, and K i is the stand-alone value of product i for customers of type . The stand-alone value of the software product comes from two sources: functions that are enabled by the software, called basic functionalities, and functions that can be developed from the software by modifying and extending the source code or using the application program interfaces (APIs) provided, called derivative value. The value of the basic functionalities are assumed to be homogenous among customers ( s i , i O or P ). 4 On the other hand, the derivative value is an increasing function of the customer's technical competence--the higher IT capability the firms have, the higher derivative value they are able to gain from the software. Without loss of generality, we assume linear function as a i ( a i 0 ), where the increasing rate a i is a feature of the software product depending on its support for further application development. Firms could incur costs for further development. We abstract this away, and assume a i represents the final benefit of the derivative value. Hence,
Depending on specific setting or software application, s O or a O can be greater, equal or smaller than s P or a P respectively. Indeed, open source software's "openness" offers easy access to the source code and a cheap (even free) access to a global pool of IT intelligence, hence may increase its power to facilitate further development (higher a O .
On the other hand, the vendor of the proprietary software has total control over the product design, provision of APIs, marketing and coordination of the developers network (Economides and Katsamakas 2005a). It's possible that under certain scenarios, the proprietary software has higher a P . We will characterize the equilibria under these different scenarios, and interpret the results in real-life practical examples.
To simplify the formulas, we assume the benefit from network externality is linearly increasing with the number of adopters:
In the analysis that follows, we solve a static game where all customers decide on which software to adopt simultaneously. 5 The analysis focuses on the conditions under which firms adopt open-source software, and the implications for the social welfare.
Simple Model Analysis and results
There are six cases depending on the relative value of the model parameters. In the following we summarize these cases. In summary, the social optimal outcome occurs when all firms adopt the superior proprietary software product. If the incremental network benefit from one more firm joining a network is not too large compared with the superiority of the proprietary product, the social optimal outcome is the only equilibrium. 
Main Model
In this model, the proprietary software vendor can influence the market equilibrium by setting price p for its product. In addition, firms adoption decision involves a range of applications. The cost structure of adopting L versus W is different. W requires a substantial fixed cost L C to customize it and make sure it works for your company, but the cost of using it in more applications is almost zero (e.g. Google scaled its Linux infrastructure on thousands of servers without having to pay a licensing fee for each server). In the specification above, e is the intensity of the network effects. It s wellestablished in the literatures on network goods that when the network effect is strong, consumers could be locked in one of the competing technologies. Nevertheless, this is not the only focus of the current model. To incorporate more effects from other variables, we restrict the magnitude of the network effect and assume that 4 / 1 e . Figure 1 , depicts important aspects of the setup of our model. There are six possible adoption patterns listed in table 1.
Firm type ( ) Captures the IT capabilities of the firm
IT architecture (range of applications used by a firm) . This is decreasing on the network effect parameter e. This happens because an increase of the W price p benefits its competitor L the more the stronger the network effect parameter e. In addition, the maximal price that W can charge and still have the whole market is e c V W 1 , which is an increasing function of e. The reason is the increasing value of the product with increasing adoption base.
The following figure shows all the possible patterns of adoption. 
Profitability of proprietary firm
We solve for the optimal pricing under each case listed in table 1, assuming 5 .
W V
, and then compare the maximum profits for all cases to determine the profit-maximizing price and profit.
The technical analysis appears in the Appendix. The final optimal price and profit at equilibrium are the following: 
Social welfare
We determine the socially optimal adoption pattern and compare it with the market equilibrium. A social planner maximizes the total surplus, that is:
Solving for the optimization problem, we have the social optimal adoption pattern is: The social planner has to consider a tradeoff between social surplus from product fit and that from network externality, which is related to the installed base of W or L in any one application. The social surplus from network effect is maximized when the market division line is flat, so for each application all firms use W or all firms use L. On the other hand, the social surplus from product fit is maximized when the division line is decreasing, so that high type firms use L for more applications than low type firms. To maximize the total social surplus, the social planner needs to balance these two effects.
The result shows that the social optimal market share between W and L involves a division line that is flatter than the one in the market equilibrium. When c is relatively large compared to e, in particular c>2e or c>4e-0.5 when 0.25-0.5e<c<1-2e, the difference in slope between the social optimal outcome and the market equilibrium is relatively small, which suggests a smaller surplus loss from network externality. The social optimal outcome leads to a market division line that is strictly above the one from market equilibrium. In other words, the social planner would like all firms to adopt more applications from W. This implies that when the product fit cost is high, the proprietary firm W charges too much for the software. Then, the social welfare loss is mostly from loss in product fit.
As c decreases, the difference in slope between the two division lines increases, and the two division lines move toward each other. Hence, more and more social surplus loss comes from loss in network externality, and less and less comes from loss in product fit. The two division lines will finally cross. In (E1), all firms inefficiently adopt L for more applications than it is socially optimal. The inefficiency is larger, the stronger the IT capabilities of the firm. In (E2), the pattern is similar, only now the high IT capability firms inefficiently adopt only open source.
In (E3) the socially optimal division is much steeper than in (E1), (E2). We observe both excessive adoption of proprietary architecture by the low type firms and
excessive adoption of open source architecture by the medium to high type firms. 
Benchmark case: W monopoly

t
The monopolistic profit is an increasing function of the intensity of network externality, and a decreasing function of the product fit cost c. When the fit cost c is high, the firms valuation for applications decreases rapidly with the distance of the application from the location of W. Hence, it is too costly for the monopolist to lower the price so that firms adopt W for all applications. Therefore, the profit maximization price is set such that all firms only adopt W for the applications that are relatively close to the location of W (Figure 4 ). This creates a loss of social welfare similar to the classical deadweight loss. Here the welfare loss is not from pricing out of the market of some firms, but because all firms are unable to use applications that do not have a good fit with the platform of the monopolist.
On the other hand, when the misfit cost c is low, W sets a price so that all firms adopt W for all their applications. A stronger e benefits the monopolist, since the firms valuation for the product increases with the adoption base.
As expected the W s profit under the monopoly case is higher than W s profit under competition from open source software. 
Concluding remarks
